

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION**

ISO New England Inc.

)

Docket No. ER11-4336-____

**REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF THE
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION AND
THE NEW ENGLAND POWER GENERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.**

Pursuant to Section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act (the “FPA”)¹ and Rule 713 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”),² the Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”)³ and the New England Power Generators Association, Inc. (“NEPGA”)⁴ hereby request rehearing of the Commission’s January 19, 2012 order in the above-captioned proceedings,⁵ which conditionally accepted the

¹ 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (2006).

² 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (2011).

³ EPSA is the national trade association representing competitive power suppliers, including generators and marketers. Competitive suppliers, which, collectively, account for 40 percent of the installed generating capacity in the United States, provide reliable and competitively priced electricity from environmentally responsible facilities. EPSA seeks to bring the benefits of competition to all power customers. The comments contained in this filing represent the position of EPSA as an organization, but not necessarily the views of any particular member with respect to any issue.

⁴ NEPGA is the largest trade association representing competitive electric generating companies in New England. NEPGA’s member companies represent approximately 27,000 MW of generating capacity in the region. NEPGA’s mission is to promote sound energy policies which will further economic development, jobs, and balanced environmental policy. The comments contained in this filing represent the position of NEPGA as an organization, but not necessarily the views of any particular member with respect to any issue.

⁵ *ISO New England Inc.*, 138 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2012) (the “Compliance Order”).

August 19, 2011 filing by ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”)⁶ of revisions to its Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”) to comply with Order No. 745.⁷

The Commission erred in accepting ISO-NE’s proposal to treat behind-the-meter generation (“BTMG”) as a demand response (“DR”) resource (“DRR”) and to permit BTMG to receive full locational marginal price (“LMP”) compensation. Such treatment of BTMG not only conflicts with the Commission’s definition of DR in Order No. 745, but also violates the FPA’s prohibition against undue discrimination as it requires that generators be compensated differently solely based on whether they are located behind or in front of the meter. Moreover, the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously failed to address serious concerns raised by EPSA, NEPGA and other parties that paying BTMG full LMP would result in undue discrimination against wholesale generation, splinter organized markets by encouraging wholesale generation to move behind the meter, facilitate gaming and other manipulative practices, harm competition, and threaten reliability and the environment. For these and other reasons set forth herein, the Commission should grant rehearing of the Compliance Order.

⁶ ISO New England, Inc.’s Order No. 745 Compliance Filing, Docket No. ER11-4336-000 (Aug. 19, 2011) (the “ISO-NE Compliance Filing”).

⁷ *Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets*, Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,322 (“Order No. 745”), *on reh’g and clarification*, Order No. 745-A, 137 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2011).

I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

In accordance with Rule 713(c)(2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure,⁸ EPSA and NEPGA hereby identify each issue on which they seek rehearing of the Compliance Order and provide representative precedent in support of their position on each of the issues:

1. The Compliance Order is contrary to law because it will result in unduly preferential treatment of BTMG, and unduly discriminatory treatment of wholesale generation, by permitting BTMG to be paid the full LMP. *See, e.g.,* 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2006), *Elec. Consumers Res. Council v. FERC*, 747 F.2d 1511, 1515-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("ELCON").
2. The Compliance Order is arbitrary and capricious, and is not the product of reasoned decisionmaking because the Commission failed to address serious and legitimate objections raised by EPSA, NEPGA and other parties that BTMG should not be treated as DRR and that doing so will result in undue discrimination against wholesale generation. *See, e.g., Canadian Ass'n of Petroleum Producers v. FERC*, 254 F.3d 289, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("CAPP"); *Moraine Pipeline Co. v. FERC*, 906 F.2d 5, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
3. The Commission's determination regarding BTMG is arbitrary and capricious and is not the product of reasoned decisionmaking because the Commission failed to respond meaningfully to objections that the undue discrimination against wholesale generators resulting from ISO-NE's proposal will incentivize wholesale generation to move behind the meter, harm competitive markets, facilitate gaming and other manipulative practices, threaten long-term reliability, and have adverse environmental impacts. *See, e.g., PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC*, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198-1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Order No. 745

In Order No. 745, the Commission held that DRRs participating in an organized wholesale energy market administered by an independent system operator ("ISO") or regional transmission organization ("RTO") must be paid the

⁸ 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(2) (2011).

full LMP for energy, provided that: (1) the DRR “has the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource”⁹; and (2) “dispatch of that [DRR] is cost-effective as determined by the net benefits test.”¹⁰

EPSA and NEPGA filed extensive comments in the Order No. 745 proceeding detailing the substantial problems with the approach proposed by the Commission in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,¹¹ and ultimately adopted, with few modifications, in Order No. 745.¹² EPSA and NEPGA, together with other groups representing a broad range of interests, sought rehearing of Order No. 745.¹³ EPSA also filed a petition for review of Order No. 745 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.¹⁴

B. The ISO-NE Compliance Filing

The ISO-NE Compliance Filing proposed a two-stage implementation process that would implement an initial set of DR compensation rules on June 1,

⁹ Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,322 at P 2.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Markets*, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,656 (2010) (the “NOPR”).

¹² See generally Comments of the Electric Power Supply Association, Docket No. RM10-17-000 (filed May 13, 2010) (“EPSA NOPR Comments”); *id.*, Attachment 1, William W. Hogan, Implications for Consumers of the NOPR’s Proposal to Pay the LMP for All Demand Response (“Hogan Policy Paper”); Reply Comments of the Electric Power Supply Association, Docket No. RM10-17-000 (filed June 30, 2010); Comments of the New England Power Generators Association, Docket No. RM10-17-000 (filed May 13, 2010); Reply Comments of the New England Power Generators Association, Docket No. RM10-17-000 (filed June 21, 2010); Post-Conference Comments of the New England Power Generators Association, Docket No. RM10-17-000 (filed Oct. 13, 2010).

¹³ See Joint Request for Rehearing of the Electric Power Supply Association, *et al.*, Docket No. RM10-17-001 (filed Apr. 14, 2011); Request for Rehearing of the Competitive Supplier Associations, Docket No. RM10-17-001 (filed Apr. 14, 2011).

¹⁴ See *Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC*, Petition for Review, Case No. 11-1489 (filed Dec. 23, 2011).

2012, and a second set of rules that would fully integrate DR resources into the energy market effective June 1, 2015.

In its Compliance Filing, ISO-NE proposed, among other things, to measure DR at the retail delivery point, thereby permitting customers to be compensated for providing DR even if they self-supplied their energy consumption by using BTMG. Accordingly, BTMG generation would be eligible to be paid the full LMP.¹⁵ EPSA filed comments and an answer opposing ISO-NE's proposed treatment of BTMG as well as addressing other aspects of the Compliance Filing.¹⁶ NEPGA also filed a protest to and comments on the Compliance Filing.¹⁷

C. The Compliance Order

In the Compliance Order, the Commission conditionally accepted ISO-NE's proposed tariff modifications, including "ISO-NE's proposed Tariff revisions that allow a demand response provider for which demand response is facilitated by behind-the-meter generation to receive full LMP compensation as a demand response resource."¹⁸ In so doing, the Commission brushed aside EPSA's, NEPGA's and others' objections that BTMG does not constitute a reduction in

¹⁵ ISO-NE Compliance Filing, Attachment 5, Testimony of Henry Y. Yoshimura at 46.

¹⁶ Comments of the Electric Power Supply Association, Docket Nos. ER11-4336-000, *et al.* (filed Sept. 12, 2011) (the "EPSA Comments"); Comments, Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of the Electric Power Supply Association on Order No. 745 Compliance Filings, Docket Nos. ER11-4106-000, *et al.* (filed Sept. 23, 2011) (the "EPSA Answer").

¹⁷ Motion to Intervene, Protest and Comments of the New England Power Generators Association, Docket Nos. ER11-4336-000, *et al.* (filed Sept. 12, 2011) (the "NEPGA Protest").

¹⁸ Compliance Order, 138 FERC ¶ 61,042 at P 77.

consumption and should therefore not be credited as a DRR and paid full LMP while consuming the same energy behind the meter.¹⁹ The Commission further rejected the notion that “ISO-NE’s proposal . . . over-compensates (and provides a double-payment to) demand response resources for which demand response is facilitated by behind-the meter generation,” finding that ISO-NE’s proposal “is consistent with Order No. 745” and “reasonably accounts for the benefits of both demand response facilitated by behind-the meter generation and energy injected onto the grid by behind-the-meter generation.”²⁰

III. REQUEST FOR REHEARING

A. **The Compliance Order Unlawfully Mandates Unduly Preferential Treatment Of BTMG And Unduly Discriminatory Treatment Of Wholesale Generators.**

The Commission should grant rehearing of its decision to accept ISO-NE’s proposal to treat BTMG as DR, and to permit BTMG to be eligible for full LMP compensation while permitting the end customer to use that same generation to supply its continued consumption.²¹ As an initial matter, while Order No. 745 did not include any directives regarding the treatment of BTMG, ISO-NE’s proposal conflicts with the definition of DR contained therein:

[A] reduction in the consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy

¹⁹ See *id.* at P 76.

²⁰ *Id.* at P 80.

²¹ While it would be appropriate to pay full LMP to any generator, including a BTMG, that produces energy that is not simultaneously used to self-supply a customer’s load, ISO-NE’s proposal permits a customer to receive full LMP payment for the energy generated by a BTMG, while also permitting that same customer to avoid wholesale energy market charges for its continued consumption.

or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy.²²

By contrast, BTMG does not involve any reduction in consumption, but instead represents an incremental increase in energy supply. Accordingly, the use of BTMG does not provide DR through load reduction and should not be paid full LMP under Order No. 745.

In addition to being inconsistent with the Commission's definition of DR, the payment of full LMP to BTMG unduly discriminates against wholesale generation. As explained in greater detail in the white paper attached to EPSA's comments on the NOPR, under the Commission's approach, a customer with BTMG can use the unit's output both to serve its own (unreduced) load and, at the same time, sell the output as price-responsive DR. By contrast, a generator located in front of the meter must either sell the output in the wholesale market as generation *or* use the generation to serve a customer's load directly, but not both.²³ The Commission's approach therefore inappropriately subsidizes BTMG-based DRRs and discriminates against generation that is not BTMG. Moreover, this subsidy ensures that BTMG units will run more frequently when installed behind the meter than generation installed in front of the meter because BTMG will appear "cost-effective" whenever the costs are less than or equal to LMP plus the retail rate, whereas a wholesale generator would be dispatched only when its costs are less than or equal to the LMP.²⁴ In short, the ISO-NE approach grants unduly preferential treatment to BTMG, even though ISO-NE's Internal Market

²² Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,322 at n.2.

²³ See Hogan Policy Paper at 7-9.

²⁴ *Id.* at 9-10.

Monitor (the “IMM”) has previously concluded that BTM generators “do not face barriers to participate in organized wholesale energy markets and . . . should not be treated as demand response.”²⁵

The FPA requires the Commission to ensure that all rates are just, reasonable, and not unduly preferential or discriminatory.²⁶ ISO/RTO rules and requirements must therefore apply equally to all generators, without regard to where they sit relative to the wholesale meter. In violation of that duty, the Commission has not only failed to treat similarly-situated wholesale market participants fairly and equitably, but has instead mandated the preferential treatment and subsidization of BTMG. The Commission has offered no rationale – and there can be none – that would support such unduly preferential treatment based solely on whether a generator is located behind or in front of the meter. The Compliance Order is therefore unlawful.²⁷

In addition, the Commission ignored its obligation to substantively respond to serious objections raised by EPSA,²⁸ NEPGA,²⁹ and others that BTMG should not qualify as DR and that payment of full LMP to BTMG would be unduly

²⁵ Memo of the ISO-NE Internal Market Monitor to the NEPOOL Markets Committee, “Opinion on behind-the-meter generation in the proposed Order 745 Transition Rules” (May 26, 2011) (the “IMM Memo”), available at http://www.iso-ne.com/committees/comm_wkgrps/mrks_comm/mrks/mtrls/2011/jun22011/a3_imm_memo_05_26_11.doc.

²⁶ See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2006).

²⁷ 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2006). See also *ELCON*, 747 F.2d at 1515-16 (finding rate design to be unduly discriminatory where the Commission and the filing utility failed to provide evidence justifying differences in rates to otherwise similarly situated customers that resulted in high-load factor customers subsidizing low-load factor customers).

²⁸ See EPSA Comments at 5-7; EPSA Answer at 16-18, 24-26.

²⁹ See NEPGA Protest at 3-8.

preferential and discriminatory.³⁰ Such failure violates the Commission's "fundamental obligation to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,"³¹ and "renders its decision . . . arbitrary and capricious."³²

B. The Commission's Finding Regarding BTMG Ignores Evidence That Its Approach Would Encourage Generation To Move Behind The Meter, Facilitate Manipulation, Harm Competition, Threaten Reliability, And Have Adverse Environmental Impacts.

In accepting ISO-NE's BTMG proposal, the Commission also failed to engage in reasoned decision-making, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously, by ignoring the serious objections of EPSA, NEPGA and others to its treatment of BTMG. As explained above, under Order No. 745 and ISO-NE's implementing rules, BTMG will receive comparatively higher compensation than a wholesale generator that is located in front of the meter. Accordingly, EPSA and NEPGA explained that payment of full LMP to BTMG would encourage generation to move from in front of the meter to behind the meter, lead to inefficient dispatch, facilitate gaming and other manipulative practices, harm competition, threaten reliability, and would have adverse environmental effects.³³ The Commission

³⁰ Rather than substantively addressing EPSA's and NEPGA's concerns, the Commission simply referred back to its determinations in Order No. 745. See Compliance Order, 138 FERC ¶ 61,042 at PP 76, 80.

³¹ *Moraine Pipeline*, 906 F.3d at 8.

³² *CAPP*, 254 F.3d at 299. See also *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (finding that an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious when it "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency") (internal citations omitted).

³³ See generally EPSA Answer at 16-30; NEPGA Protest at 8-12; IMM Memo.

brushed aside these concerns, again simply referring back to Order No. 745,³⁴ in violation of its obligations to substantively address EPSA's and NEPGA's concerns.³⁵

As EPSA has previously explained, the Commission's approach will encourage generation to move behind the meter. Indeed, ISO-NE's IMM expressed similar concerns, stating that "larger and more efficient generators have similar incentives to move behind the meter."³⁶ At the same time, the IMM pointed to market and other problems that will result:

If large generators begin to locate behind the meter of industrial and commercial customers, it would not only distort the wholesale price but makes it more difficult for the distribution and grid operators to protect contingencies caused by failures of behind-the-meter generators. Additionally, if behind-the-meter generation continues to receive this favorable treatment it will stifle investment in more efficient generation technologies in the wholesale market and raise prices to all customers over the long run, the opposite result from that which would occur in a competitive market.³⁷

As the Commission has repeatedly emphasized, large, centrally dispatched markets offer the most efficient, reliable and competitive markets for electricity.³⁸ The LMP-based energy market design was premised on all

³⁴ See, e.g., Compliance Order, 138 FERC ¶ 61,042 at P 93 (claiming that environmental impacts of Order No. 745 are "beyond the scope of this proceeding").

³⁵ See *Moraine Pipeline*, 906 F.3d at 8; *CAPP*, 254 F.3d at 299.

³⁶ IMM Memo at 3.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ See generally *Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets*, Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008); *Regional Transmission Organizations*, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 (1999). See also *Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities*, Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 235

resources supplying energy receiving the same price, which presupposes that no market participant is consuming and selling the same MW. By contrast, paying LMP to loads for “phantom load reductions” (and also avoiding the LMP charges that would have been incurred), and worse yet, paying BTMG full LMP, while allowing it to also sell that energy to the behind-the-meter load, disrupts these efficiencies, and will encourage the development of generation behind the meter, displacing wholesale generation, in order to obtain the higher prices received by BTMG (*i.e.*, full LMP plus the savings from any foregone retail or wholesale purchases). The approach adopted in the Compliance Order will therefore impede the development of ISOs/RTOs by creating perverse economic incentives that would fracture these centrally organized markets into a patchwork quilt that destroys the economic efficiency and reliability assurance that they currently provide.

In addition, EPSA’s and NEPGA’s concerns regarding the danger of market manipulation by DR providers are justified and find support both in Order No. 745 and in investigations conducted by the Commission’s Office of Enforcement (“OE”) Staff. In Order No. 745, for example, the Commission acknowledges the potential for manipulation of the baseline, concluding that “demand reductions that are not genuine may be violations of the Commission’s anti-manipulation rules.”³⁹ The IMM similarly expressed concern that “behind-

(2007); *Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service*, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 20 (2007).

³⁹ Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,322 at P 95. The Commission has, in fact, issued public notices that Commission Office of Enforcement Staff has preliminarily determined that participants in ISO-NE’s Day- Ahead Load Response Program (“DALRP”) violated the Commission’s anti-manipulation rule by artificially inflating their

the-meter generation has been used by demand resources to artificially inflate customer baselines to obtain payments while not taking any action to reduce load.”⁴⁰

The Commission also ignored EPSA’s and NEPGA’s concerns that such preferential treatment of BTMG would have adverse environmental impacts because it would promote the operation of **less** efficient, more polluting BTMG, which is not subject to the same environmental laws and emissions controls as wholesale generation, and would therefore discourage the rational development of cleaner and more efficient wholesale generation. This concern appears to have been borne out by efforts of DR providers to loosen regulations for the operation of BTMG under Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) regulations, including their successful efforts to persuade the agency to propose revisions to its National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines (the “RICE NESHAP”), which would

baseline loads and misrepresenting their load profiles to fraudulently collect DALRP payments. See Staff Notice of Alleged Violations (Jan. 25, 2011) (notice of alleged violations by Lincoln Paper and Tissue, LLC); Staff Notice of Alleged Violations (Jan. 25, 2011) (notice of alleged violations by Competitive Energy Services, LLC); Staff Notice of Alleged Violations (Jan. 25, 2011) (notice of alleged violations by Rumford Paper Company). A recent audit of a major DR provider also identified a number of instances of alleged noncompliance with ISO/RTO requirements. See, e.g., *EnerNOC, Inc.*, Docket No. PA11-20-000 (Jan. 13, 2012) (unreported) (releasing audit report). The Commission has also penalized at least one DR provider for violating the anti-manipulation rules. See *North Am. Power Partners*, 133 FERC ¶ 61,089 (2010) (order approving stipulation and consent agreement between OE and North America Power Partners (“NAPP”) to resolve violations of the Commission’s anti-manipulation rule and tariff provisions, including a civil penalty of \$500,000 and disgorgement of more than \$2.25 million, plus interest, in unjust profits). See also *In re Joseph Polidoro*, 138 FERC ¶ 61,018 (2012) (order approving stipulation with NAPP employee pursuant to which he agreed to a two year ban from participation in DR markets and to pay a civil penalty of \$50,000).

⁴⁰ IMM Memo at 2.

change the operating limitations of existing stationary compression ignition reciprocating internal combustion engines (“RICE”) to permit these units to run for longer periods in order to accommodate requirements for certain RTO emergency DR programs.⁴¹ A proposed settlement with various DR providers threatens to make the situation even worse by further increasing the annual number of hours during which such resources would be permitted to run without compliance with the RICE NESHAP.⁴² While EPSA and NEPGA do not presently know the range of environmental emissions of BTMG, such information should be calculated and analyzed before going down the path of increasing such BTMG by paying it full LMP as if it were a DR resource. There is a glaring lack of information on the extent of the problem, e.g., what types of generation comprise

⁴¹ See EPA, *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 75937 (Dec. 7, 2010). In its petition for reconsideration of this EPA action, the State of Delaware Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Control (“Delaware DNR&EC”) urged the agency to reconsider the amendment allowing RICE units to run as emergency DR, noting that in Delaware the RICE units represent a block of up to 127.5 MWs and that, in a three-hour period, they would emit between 315% - 530% more emissions than a new combustion turbine of similar size. See The Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control’s Petition for Reconsideration at 5, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-QAR-2008-0708 (April 30, 2010). The Delaware petition further points out that for these RICE units to run as DR, “such operation occurs exactly when conditions leading to the formation of ground-level ozone are at their worst. This is the type of use that would be allowed under EPA’s modified definition of emergency stationary RICE.” *Id.* at 3.

⁴² See EPA, *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines*, Proposed Settlement Agreement, 77 Fed. Reg. 282 (Jan. 4, 2012). EPSA and NEPGA have filed comments with the EPA opposing the proposed settlement. See Comments on Proposed Settlement Agreement, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OGC-2011-1030 (filed Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://epsa.org/forms/uploadFiles/2044A0000002A.filename.FINAL_comments_on_RICE_NESHAP_settlement_02032012.pdf.

BTMG and what is the environmental impact of BTMG in comparison to comparable generators in front of the meter.⁴³

Given the serious questions that have been raised regarding the impact of full LMP payment to BTMG, the Commission should neither require ISO-NE, or any other ISOs/RTOs, to adopt, nor should the Commission approve tariff changes implementing, such an approach until potential adverse consequences have been seriously explored and addressed.

⁴³ Although the scope of this proceeding is limited to ISO-NE's implementation of Order No. 745's requirements concerning energy market compensation, the subsidization of BTMG and the associated – and, to date, unanswered – environmental questions are not so limited. When BTMG masquerades as DR and thus receives the same compensation as traditional generation without assuming the same performance obligations or otherwise being subject to the same regulations as it would if it were in front of the meter, it places unjustified downward pressure on clearing prices, with the result that otherwise economic new and existing generation capacity may not be dispatched. This negatively impacts whether new generation is built and/or causes otherwise economic existing generation to exit the market prematurely. Despite numerous requests by EPSA and others, the overall environmental implications of this have not been studied or quantified by FERC and/or the EPA but are likely to be substantial, especially if the BTMG that is displacing wholesale generation is based on diesel engines as strongly appears to be the case.

